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COURT REFORM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
Margaret Y.K. Woo†
Abstract: In Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail, Malcolm Feeley
identified a number of obstacles that undermine reforms of the United States court system.
Feeley’s proposed solution was to adopt a problem-oriented “rights strategy”—letting the
courts themselves solve their problems through litigation. This is because litigation is a
forum in which courts are well placed to identify specific problems and devise pragmatic
solutions. This Article takes a look at this proposition in the context of court reforms in
China and concludes that courts (and law) are also a reflection of national goals and identity.
Any reforms to a court system must not only take into consideration expectations and
realistic goals, but also the fundamental identity of a particular legal system. In a top-down
society like China, national goals—and hence, national identity—are defined by the
Chinese Communist Party. Chinese courts have come a long way in their reforms and
court reforms in China have often been couched in the language of national goals. Any
proposed court reforms that challenge national goals and identity are doomed to fail.
Cite as: Margaret Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J.
241 (2017).

I.

INTRODUCTION
The primary problems of the courts are . . . due to changes
brought about by raised standards and increased attention . . .
politicians, the press, the scholarly community, and the courts
themselves have . . . fostered unrealistic expectations, and
promoted bold but often empty solutions that are guaranteed to
bring about disillusionment and disappointment even in the face
of significant improvements.1

Can courts be agents of their own change? In his seminal book, Court
Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail, Malcolm Feeley identifies a
number of obstacles that undermine reforms of the United States court system.
These obstacles include diverse constituencies that have different and often
conflicting expectations of the system, unattainable objectives, and the reality
that courts in the United States lack a central authority or unified value system,
and therefore are not easily susceptible to planned change. Feeley’s proposed
solution is to adopt a problem-oriented “rights strategy”—letting the courts
themselves solve their problems through litigation because it is a forum
through which courts are well placed to identify specific problems and devise
pragmatic solutions. It is a cautious call to value the incremental change
†

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Interdisciplinary Education at Northeastern
University School of Law.
1
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 3 (2013).
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courts themselves can make.
When viewed in the context of China, the question of whether courts
can be agents of their own change is more complicated. Feeley’s conclusions
about court reforms ring true in some aspects, but raise questions in others.
This Article examines the course of court reform in China and concludes that
courts (and law) are also a reflection of national goals and identity. Any
reforms to a court system must not only take into consideration expectations
and realistic goals, but also the fundamental identity of a particular legal
system. In a top-down society 2 like China, national goals—and hence,
national identity—are defined by the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese
courts have come a long way in their reforms, and court reforms in China have
often been couched in the language of national goals. Any proposed changes
that challenge national goals and identity set by the Party are doomed to fail.
Indeed, law and courts have been featured in every stage of China’s
transition from a planned to market economy. Each major law reform remains
part and parcel of China’s state building, containing provisions in each new
version that reflect the current national goals. From the first wave of law
reforms in 1979 reestablishing the court system to the latest iteration creating
“circuit courts,” each wave has been closely related to national goals and
identities. For a top-down regime like China, understanding court reforms
may require placing courts in their broader political context rather than using
a problem-oriented “rights strategy.” This is consistent with the Chinese
socialist view of law as instrumental in achieving certain substantive ends.
As early as the 1970s, China resurrected its legal system as it moved
from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and its years of isolation to join
the world market economy. At the start, China was very effective in
bifurcating its legal system, with one track more consistent with
international standards for commercial disputes involving foreign parties,
and one more in line with Communist/traditional Chinese ideology for
disputes involving domestic citizens. 3 Because foreign trading partners

The terms “top-down” and “bottom up” come from institutional economics. The top-down view of
institutions sees them as determined by laws written by political leaders. The bottom-up view sees institutions
as emerging spontaneously from the social norms, customs, traditions, beliefs, and values of individuals
within a society, with the written law only formalizing what is already shaped by the attitudes of individuals.
See generally William Easterly, Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 95 (2008).
3
See generally PITMAN POTTER, CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM (2013); CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CHINA (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011) [hereinafter CHINESE JUSTICE];
2
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were important to China’s economic development, China created a system
that gave foreign partners comfort and stability, while keeping domestic
citizens carefully in check.4
Thus, to secure international investment, China developed an arbitral
system for commercial disputes involving international parties that was based
on international norms and customs and run by China’s International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.5 The Chinese Arbitration Law
adopted and promulgated in 1994 also drew upon international arbitration
legislation and practices, especially provisions in the New York Convention
on the Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“UNCITRAL Model
Law”) promulgated by the international Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) in 1985.6 This arbitral system exists today for
the adjudication of the majority of international and domestic commercial
disputes, and mimicked the western system in its formality and relative
transparency.7
Within the domestic court arena, however, it has been a different
matter. 8 This Article focuses on China’s domestic court reforms,
specifically on its civil justice system. While criminal justice involves the
power of the state against individuals, civil justice is where ordinary citizens
can access the legal system and be the initiators of law enforcement. A
robust and fair civil justice system can empower individuals to assert their
rights and, through seemingly technical rule changes such as in civil
STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); Stanley Lubman, Bird
in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20 NORTHWEST J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383 (2000).
4
See Donald Clark, Legislating for a Market Economy in China, 191 CHINA QUARTERLY 567–85
(2007).
5
The State Council’s Reply Concerning the Renaming of the Foreign Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission as the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and the
Amendment of its Arbitration Rules, LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 21, 1988),
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/tscorctrotfeatacatcieatacataoiar1932/. On December 2, 1986, the
NPC of China declared it would adhere to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958. See also SCOTT WILSON, REMADE IN CHINA: FOREIGN INVESTORS AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN CHINA 104 (Oxford Uni. Press 2009).
6
See Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in the
Global Economy, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421, 428 (2006).
7
See The Republic of China Arbitration Law, amended July 10, 2002, effective July 10, 2002,
http://www.arbitration.org.tw/english/image/Arbitration/Arbitration%20Law%20of%20the%20Republic%
20of%20China.pdf.
8
See generally Fan Kun, Arbitration in China: Practice, Legal Obstacles and Reforms, 19 ICC INT’L
CT. ARB. BULL. 25 (2008).
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procedure rules, can serve as the basis for rule of law developments. Facing
problems with overburdened courts and increasing caseloads, Chinese court
reformers have aimed to secure efficiency and consistency in their systems
much as any other court reformers.
Yet, even as Chinese court reformers have battled issues of efficiency
and consistency, they have had to plan their incremental suggestions to
coordinate them with national goals and identity. Domestic civil procedure
and court reforms are more likely to succeed if couched in support of China’s
changing national goals—first, economic development; then, harmonious
society; and today, the Chinese dream. As will be discussed below, Chinese
court reforms have been timed and shaped in accordance with CCP stated
national goals in ways that give these reforms a uniquely Chinese flavor,
rendering them “court reform with Chinese characteristics.”9
II.

LAW TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

As an initial matter, the Chinese domestic legal system is structurally
based on a civil law model borrowed from the German system. 10 Internally,
China’s courts retain aspects of its own centuries-long tradition as a
bureaucratic empire bolstered by concepts of socialist legality. 11 Compared
to United States courts, Chinese courts have limited authority and, according
to many observers, judges are more like bureaucratic actors or civil servants
within a tightly party-controlled hierarchy than independent adjudicators.12
This led Xiao Yang, then president of the SPC, to lament, “[c]ourts have often
been taken as branches of the government, and judges viewed as civil servants
who have to follow orders from superiors, which prevents them from
exercising mandated legal duties.”13 Until recently, Chinese judges decided
cases in collegiate panels and controversial decisions had to be approved by
the court president or reviewed by the adjudication committee (an internal
9
This is a play on Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” See DENG XIAOPING,
BUILD SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS (Foreign Languages Press 1985). General Secretary Xi
Jinping in the Decision of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee also emphasized the importance
of “rule of law with Chinese characteristics,” as keeping to CPP leadership. Id.
10
See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Justice, in HANDBOOK OF CHINA’S GOVERNANCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
53–66 (Chris Ogden ed., 2013).
11
See generally LUBMAN, supra note 3; CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3.
12
See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW GROWTH NEXUS: R ULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
250 (Brookings Institute 2007); Vernon Mei Ying Hung, China’s TWO Commitments and Independent
Judicial Review: Import on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 124 (2004).
13
Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial Review (Political
Reform and Legal Project, China Program, Carnegie Endowment Working Papers No. 32),
https://www.scribd.com/document/113903735/China-s-commitment-on-independent-judicial-review.
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committee composed of leadership of the court responsible for resolving
difficult and sensitive cases). 14 This treatment of the judiciary as a
bureaucracy rather than as an independent institution is not only consistent
with China’s socialist dictates but also with its historical tradition of
developing a centralized bureaucracy to govern its population.15
One of the first codes promulgated for the adjudication of domestic civil
cases was the Chinese Civil Procedure Code, enacted for trial implementation
in 1982 and then formally in 1991. 16 Blending Maoist, socialist, and civil law
traditions, the civil procedure code emphasized conciliation, rather than
adjudication. Under Maoist/socialist thought, domestic civil disputes were
those in which no “enemies” stood out and therefore were most suitable for
informal dispute resolution by the neighborhood or mediation committees.17
This emphasis on conciliation and mediation was also consistent with the
historic Confucian tradition that placed a preference on harmony. Thus,
domestic disputes were often “resolved” by mediation, with formal trials
being quite rare. If a case was unresolved by mediation and reached the
courts, it was resolved using an inquisitorial mode of civil procedure in which
the court took control of everything from investigation to structuring the
parties’ claims.18
During this initial period, Chinese judges retained tremendous
responsibility in civil cases. As in the inquisitorial system on which the
Chinese system was based,19 there was judicial rather than party control of
litigation. The judge’s broad authority was further bolstered by the Chinese
14

See Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in the Chinese Court,
416 L. & SOC’Y REV. 681 (2012).
15
Francis Fukuyama, The Patterns of History, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 14, 15 (2012).
16
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINSHI SUSONG FA (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) [hereinafter CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991], translated
at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207339.htm. The 1991 Civil Procedure Law was amended
in 2007, and again in 2012. See QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GUANYU
XIUGAI “ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINSHI SUSONG FA” DE JUEDING (全国人民代表大会常务委员
会关于修改《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的决定) [DECISION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS ON AMENDING THE “CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA”], http://law.chinalaw info.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=98762.
17
For a classic article on Chinese mediation during the early reform years, see Jerome Alan Cohen,
Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1966) (citing Mao Tsedong’s
famous special on the correct handling of contradictions amongst the people).
18
See generally CIVIL LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE: ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND
PARTIES (C. H. van Rhee & Fu Yulin eds., 2014).
19
For a classic description of the civil law inquisitorial system, see KONRAD ZWEIGART & HEIN KOTZ,
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998).
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socialist principle under which a judge is obligated “to seek truth from facts,
and correct error whenever discovered.”20 There was a belief that litigation
should be resolved based on an objective truth rather than a legal truth, and
that litigation should end with a determination of who was truly at fault, rather
than who had proven their case. 21 Under this approach, the court was
responsible for collecting, investigating, and confirming the evidence to
unearth the truth.
The early 1990s saw an acceleration of economic development,
beginning with the Resolution on Marketization of the Fourteenth National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.22 Then Premier Deng Xiaoping,
after a “southern tour” during which he saw how much residual poverty still
existed in rural China, determined that further acceleration of market reforms
was imperative.23 For this next stage of economic development, as increased
economic development spurred greater disputes, China deepened market
reforms and encouraged the use of the courts. As will be explained below,
there were efforts at further court reform and amendments to the civil
procedure law in 1991 that gave greater importance to the role of courts in
resolving domestic civil disputes. In 1997, the Chinese Communist Party at
its Fifteenth National Congress reiterated a ten-year target for national
economic and social development that was to be achieved with a basic strategy
of “managing state affairs according to law” and “build[ing] a socialist
country ruled by law.”24
20
“Seeking Truth from Facts” is a key element of Maoism, first quoted by Mao Zedong and later
promoted by Deng Xiaoping as a central ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This goal is
codified in China Civ. P. Law of 1991, arts. 2, 7. See CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991.
21
CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991 art. 2. See also Zhong Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, Establishing the Truth
on Facts: Has the Chinese Civil Process Achieved This Goal?, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y. 393, 400–01
(2004).
22
ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG GUANYU JIANLI SHEHUI ZHUYI SHICHANG JINGJI TIZHI RUOGAN WENTI
DE JUEDING (中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定) [NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY RESOLUTION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOCIALIST M ARKET ECONOMIC
SYSTEM] (Nov. 14, 1993), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=7590.
23
See JIANG ZEMIN (江泽民), JIAKUAI GAIGE KAIFANG HE XIANDAIHUA JIANSHE BUFA DUOQU YOU
ZHONG GUO TESE SHEHUI ZHUYI SHIYE DE GENG DA SHENGLI (加快改革开放和现代化建设步伐夺取有
中国特色社会主义事业的更大胜利) [ACCELERATING THE REFORM, THE OPENING TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD
AND THE DRIVE FOR MODERNIZATION, SO AS TO ACHIEVE GREATER SUCCESSES IN BUILDING SOCIALISM WITH
CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS]
(1992),
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/201103/29/content_363504.htm.
24
See JIANG ZEMIN ( 江 泽 民 ), GAOJU DENG XIAOPING LILUN WEIDA QIZHI, BA JIANSHE YOU
ZHONGGUO TESE SHEHUI ZHUYI SHIYE QUANMIAN TUIXIANG ERSHIYI SHIJI (高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，
把建设有中国特色社会主义事业全面推向二十一世纪) [HOLD HIGH THE GREAT BANNER OF DENG
XIAOPING THEORY, ADVANCEMENT OF THE CAUSE OF BUILDING SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS’ INTO THE 21ST CENTURY] (1997), http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45607.htm.
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During this period, Chinese reformers encouraged the greater use of
law and law enforcement by ordinary citizens. No longer was legal
informality tolerated. China proclaimed itself “a country ruled by law,” and
encouraged citizens to enforce the law. 25 Economic policies and economicrelated policies were increasingly put into legal form. 26 Increased domestic
market and economic activity required the stability that a legal system could
provide in setting and enforcing predictable norms.
It is under this setting that Xiao Yang, then president of the Supreme
People’s Court, took helm to systematize and accelerate court reforms with an
eye towards increased efficiency and promotion of procedural justice.
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the Supreme People’s Court
issued several reform documents that placed a greater emphasis on separation
of functions, professionalizing the judiciary, and on trials and adjudication.
In June 1998, the SPC promulgated the Several Rules on Civil and Economic
Trials, which formally placed the burdens of providing proof on the parties,
rather than on judicial investigation, and allowed for limited discovery. 27
Additionally, in 1998, Xiao Yang, then-president of the Supreme People’s
Court, ordered a separation of functions (filing, adjudicating, and supervising)
and required every court to establish a case filing division separate from the
trial division.28 All these reforms were bolstered by the Court’s First Five
Year Reform Program (1999–2003), which placed emphasis on improvement
of the judiciary and the adjudication process.29
And so, heightened qualifications for judicial officers were established,
with a National Judicial Exam to follow. It was also a time when more
separation of functions was encouraged. A case filing division was
established which was responsible for the more routine tasks of examining
25

Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice
Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 25.
26
See generally Jacque de Lisle, Law and the Economy in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE
CHINESE ECONOMY: LAW AND THE ECONOMY IN CHINA 255–79 (Gregory Chow & Dwight Perkins eds.,
Routledge 2014).
27
See Guanyu Minshi Jingji Shenpan Fangshi Gaige Wenti de Ruogan Guiding (关于民事经济审判
方式改革问题的若干规定) [Several Rules on the Reform of Civil and Economic Trials] (promulgated by
the Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial Comm., July 11, 1998) (clarifying parties’ burdens of proof, the trial function,
and the judicial panel’s responsibilities), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_for m.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=20
233; see also Jiang Wei (江伟) & Wu Zeyong (吴泽勇), Zhengju Fa Ruogan Jiben Wenti de Fazhexue Fengxi
(证据法若干基本问题的法哲学分析) [A Jurisprudential Analysis on Several Basic Issues of Evidential
Law], 2 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [CHINESE JURIS.] 24, 45–46 (2002).
28
See RENMIN FAYUAN DIYIGE WUNIANGAIGE GANGYAO (1999–2003) [FIRST FIVE-YEAR COURT
REFORM
PROGRAM
(1999–2003)]
(Oct.
20,
1999),
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=23701.
29
Id.
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and registering cases and appeals, delivering the complaint and other litigation
documents, appointing a presiding or responsible judge and other members of
a collegial panel, fixing the date of court sessions, issuing notices, and
preserving property and evidence before trial. 30 The adjudication panel
theoretically would not have access to a case file until the case was cleared by
the case filing tribunal. The separation of functions was expected to
streamline the processing of litigation, leaving judges room to preside over
hearings and be more unbiased in adjudicating cases.31
Later amendments to the civil procedure code also added pre-trial
procedures during which parties were to exchange evidence. This, combined
with a more robust hearing, brought about the so-called two-stage trial
structure. The underlying purpose for all these reforms was to increase
efficiency by scheduling a case for substantive hearing only when it was ready
and to assure greater impartiality of judges by isolating the trial judge from
the case until the substantive hearing.32 It was an effort to professionalize the
judiciary and clarify its functions as court procedures became increasingly
complex, in part because the judiciary had suffered from inexperience and
corruption in the past.33
The SPC also set a goal of establishing an open and public trial system
in an effort to legitimize the work of the courts through increasing
transparency. During this period, Chinese reformers wavered between
promoting judges as independent adjudicators and retaining them as
bureaucratic actors, as well as between giving greater power to litigants to
shape their litigation and placing that responsibility primarily on judges.
Anticipating greater use of the courts from disputes that naturally arise from
more economic transactions, China experimented with western legal concepts
and the adversary system.34 The idea was to give more control over litigation
to the parties in an effort to ease the workload of judges and encourage greater
party autonomy.35
30

See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Lian Gongzuo de Zhanxing Guiding (最高人
民法院关于人民法院立案工作的暂行规定) [Interim Provisions of the Case Filing Division of the Supreme
People’s
Court]
(promulgated
by
Sup.
People’s
Ct.,
Apr.
21,
1997),
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=17120.
31
Nanping Liu & Michelle Liu, Justice Without Judges: The Case Filing Division in the People’s
Republic of China, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 283, 294 (2011).
32
See FIRST FIVE-YEAR COURT REFORM PROGRAM (1999–2003), supra note 28.
33
For a good analysis of the problems associated with China’s early legal system, see generally
LUBMAN, supra note 3.
34
Hualing & Cullen, supra note 25, at 25, 46–47.
35
CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991 art. 13. See also id. at 40–41.
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By focusing on the parties, dividing judicial functions and
responsibilities, and professionalizing the judiciary, these changes were
intended to pave the way for greater transparency, as decisions were rendered
in open court after exchange of evidence and oral arguments.36 During this
period, the SPC even introduced western procedural concepts into civil
justice, such as the burden of proof from the Anglo-American tradition and
the “principles of oral argument” (Verhandlungsmaxime) from the
German/Japanese tradition. 37
Concepts such as “due process,”
class/representative actions, legal vs. objective truth, “equality before the
law,” “the rule of law,” and “judicial independence,” made their way into the
conversation in the development of the Chinese civil procedure.38 Because
of the combined efforts of increased judicial professionalism, procedural
reform, and the introduction of adversarial proceedings, the mediation rate
declined steadily from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s.39
But efforts to establish greater legal formality and place burdens of
proof on the parties only added greater barriers to justice when they were
instituted without adequate legal assistance. The number of Chinese lawyers,
then and now, remains small relative to the population, and most Chinese
lawyers gravitate towards urban rather than rural areas.40 Where previously
lawyers had been state cadres employed by the government, the new private
lawyers steered towards the more profitable practice of corporate and business
law. 41 In some rural areas, lawyers and judges who were legally trained
remained rare. The effect was to increase the disparity between rich and poor
in terms of access to justice.42
See generally ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN [SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT], SEVERAL RULES ON THE
MATTERS CONCERNING REFORM OF CIVIL AND ECONOMIC TRIAL METHODS: JUDICIAL EXPLANATIONS OF
RELEVANT REGULATIONS OF CIVIL EVIDENCE LAW (People’s Court Pub. House 2002). Several Provisions of
36

the SPC on the Issues concerning the Civil and Economic Trial Mode Reform were issued in 1998. The Trial
Methods Rules were issued on July 6, 1998 and effective on July 11, 2002.
37
Id.
38
RENMIN FAYUAN DIERGE WUNIANGAIGE GANGYAO (2004–2008) (人民法院第二个五年改革纲
(2004–2008)) [SECOND FIVE-YEAR REFORM PROGRAM FOR THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2004–2008)],
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/second-five-year-reform-program-for-the-peoples-courts2004-2008-cecc#body-chinese. During this period, the SPC acknowledged the need to look overseas in
designing reforms of China’s courts.
39
See Hualing & Cullen, supra note 25, at 3.
40
See generally Fu Yulin, Dispute Resolution and China’s Grassroots Legal Services, in CHINESE
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 314.
41
Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China’s
Transition from Socialism, 113 AM. J. SOC. 352, 365–71 (2007).
42
Yulin, supra note 40, at 314.
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Added to this picture was the increasing number of disputes that
naturally occurred with economic development. Faced with increased
workload, as well as professional incentives, some Chinese judges retreated
behind a veil of legal technicality. 43 Cases were dismissed on technicalities,
or worse, often not accepted at all.44 Rather than face reversals that could
result in lower pay and diminished promotion prospects, Chinese judges
preferred to have cases go away rather than adjudicate them.45 Burdened with
the obligation to assess the complaint substantively at an initial stage but
relieved of the obligation to investigate, Chinese judges retained great
discretion in accepting or not accepting cases, and would deny acceptance of
troublesome or politically sensitive cases without offering litigants a chance
to argue otherwise. 46 For accepted cases, judges would also push for a
mediated settlement, which would not be appealed by the parties or protested
by the procuratorate.
More problematically, courts faced pressure from local government
intervention, termed “local protectionism.”47 One of the first initiatives Deng
Xiaoping undertook to stimulate the Chinese economy was to introduce fiscal
decentralization, in which the central government increasingly cut
intergovernmental transfers and shed its fiscal responsibilities to lower levels
of government.48 This has provided local governments with a strong incentive
to shield local firms and industries from interregional competition, as well as
to protect state-owned enterprises under their administration. Such local
businesses are often a local government’s base of political power, and source
of fiscal revenue and private wealth. In turn, courts (themselves financed by
local governments) were then pressured to exert “local protectionalism,” and
to rule on behalf of home litigants.49
Initially, as the economy grew, the central government in Beijing had
high hopes that courts, prompted by disgruntled citizens, could assist in
43

See Sida Liu, With or Without the Law: The Changing Meaning of Ordinary Legal Work in China,
1979–2003, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 234.
44
See Liu & Liu, supra note 31, 284–65, 287–88.
45
See Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial
Chinese Heritage Lives On, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 58.
46
Liu & Liu, supra note 31, at 320.
47
Thus, the First Five-Year Court Reform Plan targeted local protectionism as one danger to “socialist
rule of law.” See FIRST FIVE-YEAR COURT REFORM PROGRAM (1999–2003), supra note 28.
48
Chunli Shen at al., Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps,
13 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 1, 10 (2012).
49
See Judicial Independence in the PRC, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA,
https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc.

December 2017

Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics

251

reining in local governments and growing corruption.50 Even as courts, faced
with increasingly complex cases and procedures, retreated behind a veil of
technocracy, the early 2000s saw more corruption cases involving court
personnel. The conviction of Huang Songyu, 51 a former vice president of the
Supreme People’s Court, and the subsequent investigation of Xi Xiaoming,
serve as visible examples of alleged judicial corruption at the highest level. 52
As Malcolm Feeley stated in his analysis of court reforms, a high expectation
for court reform could render any reforms unattainable. This was indeed the
case for China. High hopes and aspirations when confronted with actual
dissatisfied experiences led Mary Gallagher to term the phenomenon of
“uninformed enchantment” and “informed disenchantment” in relation to the
Chinese court system.53 Disgruntled and dissatisfied litigants, failing to get
satisfaction in the courts, turned to petitioning (xinfang) en mass to Beijing. 54
More threatening to the central state, some petitioners even resorted to
protesting in the streets.55

III.

A RETURN TO HARMONY

By the mid-2000s, increased citizen discontent with growing inequality
due to unchecked economic growth spilled out into social unrest in the streets.
Just as economic reforms led to greater disparity within the Chinese
population, so also the reality of greater legal formality without greater legal
representation led to greater dissatisfaction with Chinese courts. Litigants
50

Ren Jianxin (任建新), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao 1996 Nian (最高人民法院工作报
告 1996 年 ) [Supreme People’s Court Work Report, 1996] (Mar. 12 1996),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/07/content_5003526.htm.
51
China Jails Former Top Judge for Corruption, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2010,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/19/china-supreme-court-judge-jailed (Corruption cases can
sometimes be a reflection of the tug between judicial independence and Party loyalty. Notably, Huang was
famous for issuing the first court decision based on China’s constitution—a ruling overturned soon after
Huang was dismissed from his post).
52
Lauren Hilgers, A Chinese Supreme Court Justice Falls From Grace, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 28,
2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/china-supreme-court-corruption-crackdown/.
53
See Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed Disenchantment” and the
Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 783 (2006).
54
Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L.
103, 103–05 (2006).
55
Spasms of public anger against perceived injustices or government corruption occur periodically in
China, but the protest against the cover-up of a teenage girl’s rape and murder, in the seat of Weng’an County
in Guizhou Province, resulted in thousands of protestors, and fire being set in a government complex and
police cruisers. In other words, this protest was larger and more destructive than usual. Jill Drew, Anger over
Rape-Murder Case Sparks Riot in China, WASH. POST, June 30, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062900805.html.
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flocked to file letters and petitions of appeal to governmental agencies, as well
as flocked to the streets.56 The Chinese state responded with a combined
strategy of harmony and populism.
Concerned with threats of social instability, the Chinese government
launched its next set of policy reforms. This time, the emphasis was on
preserving social harmony. 57 Then-President Hu Jingtao announced the
national goal of preserving a “harmonious society” (和谐社会). 58 In his
government work report delivered at the opening meeting of the Third Session
of the Tenth National People’s Congress (“NPC”), Premier Wen Jiabao in
2005 promised that the government would “strive to solve outstanding
problems vital to the immediate interests of the people, safeguard social
stability and build a harmonious socialist society.”59
In response, the Chinese legal system resurrected its historical
preference for mediation over adjudication and its trial reforms blended both
an effort to ensure “stability at all costs,”60 as well as pragmatic solutions to
increase efficiency and accountability. Reminiscent of traditional Confucian
philosophy, the emphasis was on stability and tranquility, resolving rather
than adjudicating disputes. Courts, rather than adjudicate right from wrong,
were increasingly asked to act as the safety valve for a widening range of
popular complaints. 61 While court access was theoretically addressed by
lower court fees,62 and the substitution of a registration system for a filing

56

See Minzner, supra note 54, at 103–05.
See China Publishes ‘Harmonious Society’ Resolution, CHINA.ORG.CN (Oct. 19, 2006),
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/184810.htm.
58
Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society,’ WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR20061011
01610.html.
59
Letian Pan, Premier Wen Stresses Building of “Harmonious Society,” XINHUA, Mar. 5, 2005,
http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-03/05/content_30052.htm.
60
Social stability at all costs also permeates China’s criminal justice system. See Joseph Kahn, Deep
Flaws and Little Justice, in China’s Court System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/09/21/world/asia/deep-flaws-and-little-justice-in-chinas-court-system.html.
61
Benjamin Liebman, Chinese Courts: Restricted Reforms, 21 COL. J. ASIAN L. 1, 23–25 (2007).
62
The Litigation Cost Payment Act (诉讼费用交纳办法), effective April 1, 2007, lowered court fees
from 4% to .5% to 2.5% of the monetary compensation for cases at the low but raised the rates for upper tier
cases with disputed property valued at one million yuan. For property valued at less than 10,000 yuan, a flat
fee of 50 yuan applies. While this enables ordinary citizens to bring litigation, it further divided the courts in
terms of resources since court fees still constitute a percentage of a court’s finances.
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system for complaints was proposed, 63 Chinese judges were urged to end
disputes rather than adjudicate them in an effort preserve harmony. 64
Chinese courts responded. Even as prior reforms to professionalize the
judiciary and to streamline litigation continued, the SPC couched its reforms
this time in a language consistent with the goal of a “harmonious society.”65
In 2007, the SPC issued an opinion that instructed the Chinese judiciary to
“mediate if possible” and to “resolv[e] cases and solv[e] problems to promote
social harmony.”66 In its Third Five Year Court Reform Plan (2009–2013),
the SPC noted that “increasing social harmony” was one of its primary tasks,
and strengthening power restraints and supervision were its focus. 67
Promoting social harmony for the courts in this instance meant more mediated
outcomes rather than adjudicating rights in a particular dispute.
During these years, the Chinese government promoted an official
national “grand mediation” (da tiaojie) campaign, in part to relieve pressure
on courts and to respond to what was perceived as a litigation explosion. 68 In
2009, Sichuan Province boasted that its mediators (renmin tiaojie yuan) and
mediation organizations (renmin tiaojie zuzhi) had resolved 527,000 disputes,
which the government claimed contributed to a 23.5% drop in “mass
63
A case registration system was established this year by the Supreme People’s Court. See Guanyu
Renmin Fayuan Tuixing Lian Dengji Zhi Gaige de Yijian (关于人民法院推行立案登记制改革的意见)
[Opinion on the Implementation of the People’s Courts Reform of the Case-filing Registration System]
(promulgated
by
Sup.
People’s
Ct.,
Apr.
1, 2015,
effective
May 1,
2015),
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=246925.
64
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Sifa Jianyi Gongzuo Wei Goujian Shehui
Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Tigong Sifa Fuwu de Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于进一步加强司法建议工作为构建
社会主义和谐社会提供司法服务的通知) [Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court, Regarding the Next
Step Towards Litigation Development According to Socialist Principals and Harmonious Society], para. 2
(Sup. People’s Ct. 2007), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=91949.
65
See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW AND STABILITY IN CHINA (Sue Trevaskes et al. eds., 2014).
66
Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Fahui Susong Tiaojie Zai Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Zhong Jiji
Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian (关于进一步发挥诉讼调解在构建社会主义和谐社会中积极作用的若干意
见 ) [Several Opinions on Further enhancing the Positive Effect of Court-Directed Mediation in the
Construction of a Harmonious Socialist Society], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., at 25 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2007).
67
Notice, Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Infa 《Renmin Fayuan Desangge
Wunian Gaige Mouyi (2009-2013)》 de Tongzhi [Qianxing Youxiao] (最高人民法院关于印发《人民法
院第三个五年改革纲要 (2009－2013)》的通知 [现行有效]) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on
Issuing the Third Five-Year Reform Outline for the People’s Courts (2009–2013)], http://en.pkulaw.cn/displa
y.aspx?cgid=114912&lib=law; see also RENMIN FAYUAN DI SAN GE WU NIAN GAIGE GANYAO (2009–2013)
(人民法院第三个五年改革纲要) [THIRD FIVE-YEAR REFORM PLAN FOR THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2009–
2013)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 17, 2009, effective March 17, 2009),
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show/php?file_id=134421.
68
PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE: A PROCEDURALIST
DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE 113 (Leiden et al. eds., 2017).
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incidents” and a 47.3% decline in grievances filed through the petition
(xinfang) system. 69 That same year, the Chinese government moved to
stream-line mediation procedures and, on August 28, 2010, the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the first People’s Mediation
Law (“PML”), effective on January 1, 2011.70 In presenting the draft law for
approval in June, Minister of Justice Wu Aiying told the Standing Committee
that “[m]ediation should be the first line of defense to maintain social stability
and promote harmony.”71
For disputes that did turn into litigation, Chinese judges resumed their
active role in case management, particularly for collective action cases that
had the potential to turn into disorder. Group litigation was discouraged and,
if filed, was disaggregated into individual lawsuits. The idea was to keep a
close eye on potential sources of local unrest by monitoring these lawsuits and
preventing them from developing into full-blown social conflicts.
Accordingly, civil procedure rules were also amended in 2012 to reflect this
strategy of diverting civil cases through a system of multi-tracking, mediation,
and disaggregation.
By the time of its Fourth Judicial Reform Plan (2014–2019), the
Supreme People’s Court identified the completion of “Diversified Dispute
Resolution” as one of the major aims of the reform. 72 Under diversified
dispute resolution, courts are expected to segregate different tracks for
different kinds of cases with a renewed emphasis on mediation. 73 Judges
69
Pei Zhiyong, He wei gui diao wei xian sichuan quanmian goujian “da tiaojie” gongzuo tixi
[Harmony Valued, Mediation First—Sichuan Completes Building of “Great Mediation” Work System],
PEOPLE’S DAILY, Mar. 23, 2010.
70
PEOPLE’S MEDIATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (promulgated by Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress, Aug. 28, 2010, effective Jan. 01, 2011),
http://www.cspil.org/Uploadfiles/attachment/Laws%20and%20Regulations/[en]guojifalvwenjian/PeoplesM
ediationLawofthePeoplesRepublicofChina.pdf.
71
Zhu Zhe & Lan Tian, Mediation Draft Law Could Ease Tension, CHINA DAILY, June 23, 2010,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/23/content_10005555.htm.
72
Memorandum, Supreme People’s Court, Guan Yu Ren Min Fa Yuan Jin Yi Bus Hen Hua Duo Yuan
Hua Jiu Fen Jie Jue Ji Zhi Gai Ge Di Yi Jian (关于人民法院进一步深化多元化纠纷解决机制改革的意
见 ) [Concerning the People’s Courts More Deeply Reforming the Diversified Dispute Resolution
Mechanism] (June 29, 2016), http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-22742.html.
73
Id. (The SPC stated that it will “[c]ontinue to promote mediation, arbitration, administrative rulings,
administrative reconsideration or other dispute settlement mechanisms with an organic link to litigation,
mutually coordinate and guide parties to choose an appropriate dispute resolution. Promote the establishment
of dispute mechanisms that are industry-specific and specialized in the areas of land requisition and property
condemnation, environmental protection, labor protection, health care, traffic accidents, property
management, insurance and other areas of dispute, dispute resolution professional organizations, promote the
improvement of the arbitration systems and administrative ruling systems.”).
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must, in the early stages of litigation, assess and track the case in one of the
following four ways—if the case has little or no factual disputes (such as in
debt collection), an expedited procedure (du cu cheng xu, 督 促 程 序 ,
translated loosely as “supervising procedure”) is to be used; mediation is to
be used if the litigants’ dispute is more substantial, but believed to be capable
of settlement; otherwise, courts are expected to use simplified procedure (jian
yi cheng xu, 简易程序) or ordinary procedure (pu tong cheng xu, 普通程
序), according to the needs of the case; and trial procedure (kai ting sheng li,
开庭审理) should be used for a case that requires litigants to exchange
evidence to clarify the points of dispute. 74
Undeniably, these numerous court reforms were motivated by a desire
to efficiently handle the workload faced by any overburdened court system.
According to the Supreme People’s Court, the number of court cases rose by
at least 25% between 2005 and 2009, but the total number of judges (190,000)
remained almost the same.75 By 2009, civil cases made up 86% of the total
cases handled by the courts, compared to 12% for criminal cases.76 According
to at least one observer, recent reforms are a reflection of an “institutional
pragmatism” on the part of Chinese courts to protect their own institutional
power by enhancing efficiency. 77 Many of the court reform proposals can be
said to meet any judicial system’s goals of uniformity and efficiency. Yet, the
reform methods chosen by SPC were heavily flavored by the national policy
as identified by the Party at the time. Although, as Malcolm Feeley suggests,
incremental changes by the courts themselves must be encouraged, one
additional factor that has to be taken into consideration is the role of courts
and civil justice in nation and state building. Particularly for top-down
regimes such as China, any reform must be consistent with the national goals
defined by the CCP, and in this instance, that goal was creating a harmonious
society.
IV.

THE CHINESE DREAM

74

CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991 art. 133.
Huazhong Wang & Jingqiong Wang, Courts Hit by Rising Number of Lawsuits, CHINA DAILY, July
14, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/14/content_10102630.htm.
76
KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN CHINA 176
(Cambridge Uni. Press 2017).
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See generally Taisu Zhang, The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s Court of
China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2012).
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Most recently, China has advanced yet another national goal: the
“Chinese Dream.” Just after becoming the General Secretary of the
Communist Party of China in late 2012, Xi Jinping announced what would
become the hallmark of his administration—that is, the pursuit of “the
Chinese Dream.” 78 The Chinese Dream, according to Xi, is “the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Chinese citizens, President Xi urged,
should “dare to dream, work assiduously to fulfill the dreams and contribute
to the revitalization of the nation.” 79 The goal is less about individual
fulfillment or convergence towards a universal community, and more about
Chinese prosperity, national glory, and the collective effort towards that goal.
This inward turn has led to greater “internal repression, external truculence,
and a seeming indifference to the partnership part of the United States-China
relationship.” 80 It is an inward turn towards nationalism, an appeal to
patriotism, and efforts to re-centralize.
Indeed, the “Chinese Dream” means pulling together as a nation, but it
is also an inward turn for reformers and citizens. Party leaders have cautioned
against borrowing institutions wholesale from abroad, focusing instead on
centralizing and securing China’s increasingly fragmented interests. 81 On
October 23, 2014, the 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party issued its decision concerning “Comprehensively
Promoting Governing the Country According to Law.”82 While this is not the
first time the CCP inserted law in its programmatic proposals,83 this is the first
78
Rogier Creemers, The Chinese Dream Infuses Socialism with Chinese Characteristics with New
Energy, CHINA COPYRIGHT & MEDIA, May 6, 2013, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com
/2013/05/06/the-chinese-dream-infuses-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-with-new-energy/.
79
Xi urges youths to contribute to “Chinese Dream,” CHINA DAILY, May 4, 2013,
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/04/content_16476315.htm.
80
James
Fallows,
China’s
Great
Leap
Backward,
ATLANTIC,
Dec.
2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/. In that same
article, Asia Society’s Orville Schell stated, “In my lifetime I did not imagine I would see the day when China
regressed back closer to its Maoist roots. I am fearing that now.”
81
See Chris Buckley, Xi Jinping Assuming New Status as China’s “Core” Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/asia/china-president-xi-jinping-core.html?mcubz=0
(according to Xinhua, the state run news agency, a meeting of the Politburo, a council of the Party’s twentyfive most senior cadres reached the conclusion that the key to strengthening party leadership is maintaining
the centralized and unified leadership of the party center,” and urged officials to support a “staunch leadership
core.”).
82
An English translation of the Fourth Plenum Decision is available at http://chinacopyrightand
media.wordpress.com/2014/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-incomprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/
[hereinafter
Plenum
Decision].
83
Since the 11th Party Congress, China has recognized the need for law in a market economy and in
1999, China acknowledged incorporated the words “rule the country according to law, establish a socialist
rule of law state” into its constitution.
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time a CCP central committee devoted an entire plenary session decision
solely to the topic of law. More importantly, the Plenum Decision
unequivocally reaffirmed the centralizing primacy of the Party and the
national government as the initiator of law. 84
Containing both symbolic messages and concrete proposals, the
Plenum Decision unapologetically outlined the dominance of China as a
developmental state and the role of the Chinese Communist Party within it.85
Having studied foreign models in other countries for the last thirty years, a
more powerful and assertive China is now emphasizing that it will follow its
own development path to legal reforms and “will not indiscriminately copy
foreign rule of law concepts and models.” China, under the leadership of the
CCP, will be the one to define what is meant by “socialist rule of law with
Chinese characteristics.”
Chief Justice Zhou, the head of the Supreme People’s Court in
Beijing, in a recent statement to legal officials, declared, “[w]e should
resolutely resist erroneous influence from the West: ‘constitutional
democracy,’ ‘separation of powers’ and ‘independence of the judiciary.’”
Chief Justice Zhou, a moderate reformer who has strived to professionalize
the Chinese judiciary in recent years, has bowed to the strict political climate
that Xi Jinping has established in China in response to rising domestic
instability. 86
The “Chinese Dream” has resulted in greater constraints on civil
society, such as stamping out support for an independent press, sharply
limiting speech on the internet, and urging the reduction of “foreign”
influences on “socialist law with Chinese characteristics.”87
How much of this inward turn filters down to the individual judge
level is certainly subject to speculation, as some judges may still continue
to interact with foreign courts and reference (although never cite to) foreign
court decisions.88 But the admonition is a reminder that “socialist law with
84

See Plenum Decision, supra note 82.
See id.
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Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Judge Rejects Judicial Independence and Legal Reformers Wince,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courtszhou-qiang.html.
87
Id.
88
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Chinese characteristics” 89 encompasses the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party and, specifically, the Central Committee of the CCP.
Operationally, the Plenum Decision openly acknowledges, “in all cases
where legislation involves adjustment to major structures or major policies,
it must be reported to the Party Central Committee for discussion and
decision.”90 While it is common knowledge that most legislation must be
approved by the Party leadership, this is the first time that the Party openly
acknowledged and affirmed concretely its role in China’s governance and
the making of laws. Further, the Plenum Decision explicitly emphasizes the
dual structure of the Party-state constitutional order. China will govern
according to law (依法治国), but the Party will be governed according to
its own internal regulations (依 规 治 党). 91 According to the Plenum
Decision, Party discipline can be more stringent than law. 92
Several major reforms reflect this most recent focus in developing a
Chinese version of rule of law that would be consistent with today’s “Chinese
Dream” ideal and its language of nationalism. While some of these reform
efforts have roots from before the “Chinese Dream,” they have more recently
moved front and center, to not only improve uniformity and access in the civil
justice system, but to attempt to re-centralize control. Indeed, consistent with
today’s tone, these measures all seek to recentralize the court system and
redirect authority back to the central state. These include efforts to centralize

书如何引用法律规范性文件的批复) [The SPC Reply on How People’s Courts Should Cite Regulatory
Legal Documents in Making Court Documents] (Oct. 28, 1986), http://www.lawlib.com/Law/law_view.asp?id=3936. Officially, neither case law nor foreign law is allowed to be cited in
Chinese domestic judgments. See also Fa Shi [2009] No. 14 (July 13, 2009),
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201002/t20100210_1065.htm. The SPC also formally enacted The
Provisions on Citation to Regulatory Legal Documents Including Laws and Regulations in Court Decisions
(effective November 4, 2009), which specified the sources of law that are allowed to be cited in court
decisions as: laws and legal interpretations, administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous
regulations, separate regulations, and judicial interpretation. See also Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation
Through Intimidation: An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 33, 104
(2006) (In practice, when encountering new or difficult legal questions, lower court judges often consult with
higher courts for instruction. In the early 2000s, scholars noted some borrowing of legal concepts as in the
defamation area).
89
See Plenum Decision, supra note 82.
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
However, to ensure that leaders in all sectors take law seriously, the Plenum Decision anticipates
that law indicators be written into annual cadre performance evaluations. The Plenum Decision also promises
a more rule-based order for the Party—party rules will be strengthened and while party institutions, such as
political legal committees and party cells in the courts, will continue, their roles, authority, and duties will be
clarified. Interestingly, Party internal rules are highly formal and structured, and some even contain aspects
of due process protection (“shuang gui” hearing). Xinhua reported on a two-year old campaign within the
Party system (中央
公厅法规局) to clean up (qingli), or old/conflicting Party rules and regulations.
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funding of the courts,93 develop a uniform case guidance system, and create
inter-regional courts that hear inter-provincial disputes. Again, while each of
these reforms can be said to be necessary for any legal system to ensure
uniformity and consistency, the features, constraints, and timing of each
measure are unique to China and dominated by the goals of centralization and
nationalization.
First, as noted earlier, China’s major developmental strides since the
late 1970s have been the result of a strategy of decentralization of finances. 94
Under the policy of “eating in different kitchens,” local governments have
been required to cover their own costs with their own revenues. 95 Because
court funding is derived mainly from the budget of the government at the same
administrative hierarchal level, 96 court budgets have varied greatly, leaving
courts in less developed regions with budgets that fail to meet minimal normal
operational expenses.97 Where funding has been scarce, many courts have
resorted to extra-budgetary funding collected from litigation fees and judicial
fines imposed on litigants. Since local courts are financially beholden to local
governments, local party bosses have also controlled judicial appointments,
judicial salaries, and promotions, and as a result they have often influenced
the work of the courts.98
Insufficient court funding has induced judges to engage in “profit
making” activities, such as collecting arbitrary litigation fees and selecting
high fee cases; but more concerning to the central government, local funding
has made courts more susceptible to pressure from local government than to
central government commands. Thus, in 2017, in the latest White Paper on
Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, the central government identified
“promoting centralized management of personnel, financial and material
resources of local courts below provincial level” as one of the major reforms
needed.99 The White Paper proposes that management of local courts below
the provincial level be taken away from commission departments at the

93

Xin He, Court Finance and Court Responses to Judicial Reforms: A Tale of Two Chinese Courts,
31 L. & POL’Y 463 (2009).
94
Shen et al., supra note 48, at 1–5.
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Id.
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Id.
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He, supra note 93.
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See Judicial Independence in the PRC, supra note 49.
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China Issues White Paper on Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 27, 2017,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-02/27/content_28361584.htm [hereinafter China Issues White
Paper].
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municipal or county level and placed with the provincial commission
department with the assistance of the higher people’s court in that region.100
Towards this goal, a centralized funding management system has also
been explored in which funding for local courts in some provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government
is allocated in the central government budget and managed by provincial level
financial departments. 101 These proposed measures would centralize
funding,102 which in theory would reduce local courts’ financial dependence
on local government. Interestingly, while this might free local courts from
local government influence, it might also increase the power of the SPC and
provincial high courts who are poised to play a much bigger role in budget
preparation.
Second, there is now an immediate task to unify and set uniform legal
outcomes through a case guidance system, established centrally by the SPC.
As noted earlier, the Chinese legal system is at its base a blend of Maoistsocialist legal thought overlaid on top of a civil law system. As in other civil
law systems, Chinese legislation remains supreme, and unlike the common
law system, judges are said to apply, not make, the law. Yet absent a
precedent system, this has meant that lower courts may have greater leeway
in interpreting legislation and adjudicating cases. While individual judges are
circumscribed by a “collegiate panel” of judges and often supervised
internally by the adjudication committee, each court may nevertheless rule in
ways inconsistent with other lower courts and inconsistent with the intent of
the central government.103 A case guidance system, much like the precedent
system within common law systems, would allow the Supreme People’s Court
to unify and “rein in” lower provincial courts, not only through the timeconsuming process of individual appeals, but also through more systematic

100

See id.
See id. See also Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively
Deepening the Reform Regulates “Unify the Management of Personnel and Budgets of Courts and
Procuratorates Below the Provincial Level,” XINHUA, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201311/15/c_118164235.htm.
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See Chine Issues White Paper, supra note 99.
103
Another experiment in combating inconsistent judgments and local protectionism is the introduction
of cameras in the Chinese courtroom. See Jerome Cohen & David Wertime, A Crack of Daylight Enters
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methods such as interpretations and circulars, with publications of important
cases.104
The idea of “case law,” while not binding, has long existed within the
Chinese legal tradition, from the dynastic period to the Republican period
(1912–1949). Legal cases were compiled to aid imperial magistrates in their
adjudication of cases.105 With the reestablishment of the legal system in postMao China, in 1985, the Supreme People’s Court began its now-established
practice of publishing “typical cases” (dianxin anli) in its official publication,
the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court. This work continued in 1999
when the SPC called for “diligence” in pursuing a system of case guidance.106
In 2004, the SPC added a new section to publish cases in the Gazette that
contained legal rules abstracted from each case.107 But it was not until 2005
that the Second Five Year Reform Plan listed constructing a guiding cases
system as a policy objective for the Court.108
Chinese legal scholars have debated the merits of adopting a precedent
system like the Anglo-American system.109 Chinese judges are said to apply
law, but not to make it as judges do under the common law precedent system.
The role of the Supreme People’s Court, meanwhile, is to supervise and guide
the lower courts, not to make new law. 110 Thus, the call is for the creation of
“guiding,” not binding, cases.111 It is significant that it was not until 2010 that
the present framework of the “case guidance system” gathered momentum
and took shape. During that year, the SPC’s Adjudication Committee issued
the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case
Guidance (“Provisions”), 112 and later in 2015, clarifying regulations
104
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(“Rules”).113 From 2011, when the SPC first published guiding cases, until
2017, the SPC has issued close to eighty-seven decisions114 that courts “at all
levels should refer to . . . when adjudicating similar cases.”115 These cases
serve to fill in holes in legislation and prior judicial interpretations. Yet, under
the Chinese case guidance system, the Supreme People’s Court issues cases
as guidance which are de facto, if not de jure, binding on lower courts.116
Guiding cases are uploaded to a centralized website run by the Supreme
People’s Court and are meant to educate and guide lower courts on how to
handle particular points of law. Along with model cases issued by the SPC,
lower courts also began posting selected represented cases online.117 In 2009,
under the leadership of Wang Shengjun, president of the SPC, the SPC itself
made a big push to increase judicial transparency in its Third Five Year Court
Reform Plan by placing a large number of court decisions online. 118 As of
June 2017, close to 29 million lower court cases have been posted. 119 While
the primary motive for putting lower court cases online appears to be a desire
to curb wrongdoings in the lower courts through greater transparency, the
establishment of a SPC case guidance system, by contrast, can centralize and
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funnel authority back to the central SPC, even as it improves uniformity and
potentially the quality of court decisions across China.120
Finally, along with the centralizing function of the SPC’s guiding cases,
the SPC also recently inserted its own physical presence in the provinces in
the form of circuit courts. In 2014, the Central Committee Fourth Plenum
decision announced the establishment of circuit courts as branches of the
Supreme People’s Court to hear inter-regional cases.121 In its Fourth Plenum
Decision, the CCP Central Committee mandated that “the Supreme People’s
Court shall set up circuit courts to handle important and complicated
administrative, civil and commercial cases of diversity jurisdiction.”122 These
circuit courts are said to have been launched on a trial basis, but interestingly,
the creation of these courts was accomplished by Xi Jinping and the Central
Committee, rather than through amendments of the Constitution or changes
to the Organic Law of People’s Court. 123 This is a bold move since the
establishment of these new inter-regional courts could serve to federalize
provincial courts without making legislative changes.
Two reasons were given for the establishment of the circuit courts: to
bring the SPC closer to the lower level areas and to make it easier for litigants
to bring uniformity to the legal system. 124 The Fourth Plenum Decision states,
“[b]y moving down the office of the Supreme People’s Court and solving
disputes at locality, it may provide convenience to the parties in lawsuits, and
may also allow the Supreme People’s Court to focus on the formulation of
judicial policies and judicial interpretations, as well as on the trying of cases
which are of significant guidance for the unification of laws.”125
Certainly, the creation of the circuit courts was in response to increased
social instability and public dissatisfaction with the legal system, as well as
concerns about the large number of angry petitioners coming to the SPC’s
Beijing office. But more significantly, the creation of the circuit courts took
120
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fruition at a time when the Central Committee wanted to reassert central
control and curb local interference by bringing the center closer to the
localities. According to the Party’s own documents, the Third Session of the
Eighteenth CCPCC was focused on professionalizing the judiciary, managing
courts and prosecutors unified by province level, and separating judicial
jurisdiction from administrative jurisdiction. 126 The Fourth Plenum, however,
focused on lowering the center of gravity of judicial work, to have more
disputes resolved locally and conveniently, and letting the SPC headquarters
in Beijing concentrate on unification of the application of law. 127 These
circuit courts, as an arm of the Supreme People’s Court, do just that—bring
central authority down to resolve disputes locally and funnel information back
to Beijing.
Indeed, one of the stated goals for these circuit courts is to reduce
interference from local governments. As a cross-provincial court, the circuit
court removes inter-jurisdictional cases from local courts which might be
subject to pressures of “local protectionism.”128 As divisions of the Supreme
People’s Court, meanwhile, decisions from these newly created circuit courts
have the authority of the Supreme People’s Court. As a part of the Supreme
People’s Court, these circuit courts are powerful enough that provincial
governments cannot intervene in their verdicts. Moreover, by having these
courts hear cases involving national interests, Beijing can be more assured
that the results will be consistent with what it dictates. The central control
gained by these circuit courts will both eliminate local bias and ensure greater
consistency. Establishing such courts then helps to reduce power at the local
level and consolidates it in the hands of central authorities—an effort which
is also crucial for seeing through the implementation of economic
restructuring.
At the same time, these circuit courts can also divert some of the unrest
back to the provinces by funneling disputes, lawsuits, and petitions to the
provinces, while all the while collecting information on particular issues for
consideration at SPC headquarters in Beijing. They will also serve as a
platform for judicial reform measures on a trial basis before launching those
measures throughout the entire court system. It is the hope of the Beijing
government that these circuit courts reassert central control, provide
uniformity, and tangibly represent national authority in the localities.
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Accordingly, creation of the circuit courts was carried out with lightning
speed.
On December 2, 2014, the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms deliberated and passed the Pilot Plan for the Supreme
People’s Court to set up circuit courts. On December 28, 2014, the People’s
Congress appointed the first president and vice president of the First Circuit
and the Second Circuit.129 In January 2015, the Adjudication Committee of
the Supreme People’s Court quickly issued Regulations of the Supreme
People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Case Trial of Circuit Courts,
which stipulate, “the circuit courts are the permanent judiciary organs
dispatched by the Supreme People’s Court. The verdicts, rulings and
decisions made by the circuit courts are verdicts, rulings and decisions of the
Supreme People’s Court.” 130 Each of these courts is empowered to hear
major administrative cases, and civil and commercial cross-jurisdictional
cases, as well as petitions within their circuit areas.131
By the end of January 2015, two such courts were already in operation:
the No. 1 Circuit Court in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, with Guangdong
Province, Guangxi Autonomous Region, Hainan Province, and Henan (added
in 2016) in its circuit area, and the No. 2 Circuit Court in Shenyang, Liaoning
Province, with Liaoning Province, Jilin Province, and Heilongjiang Province
in its circuit area.132 Four additional courts were added by the end of 2016:
the No. 3 Circuit Court in Nanjing whose circuit covers Jiangsu, Shanghai,
Zhejiang, Fujian, and Jiangxi; the No. 4 Circuit Court in Zhenzhou whose
circuit covers Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, and Hubei;133 the No. 5 Circuit Court in
Chongqing whose circuit covers Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, and
Tibet; and the No. 6 Circuit Court in Xi’an, whose circuit covers Shaanxi,
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxi, and Xinjiang.134
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These circuit courts are responsible for adjudicating major
administrative cases and trans-regional civil and commercial cases. As the
standing local judicial organs dispatched by the Supreme People’s Court, the
judgments, rulings, and decisions made by these circuit courts have the same
effect as those made by the Supreme People’s Court.135 As of December 31,
2016, the No. 1 and No. 2 Circuit Courts had accepted 4622 cases, concluded
4534 cases, and received 73,000 visitors in total.136 Additionally, these two
courts have become the “experimental units” and “pacesetters” of some of the
judicial reforms conducted by the Supreme People’s Court.137 Finally, these
circuit courts have held meetings with local courts and serve to “guide”
judicial work apart from hearing the cases themselves.138
China has created more experimental courts, including courts
specifically directed to administrate cases against local governments. For
example, two trans-district courts were created as part of a pilot program to
resolve administrative cases across city districts. In December 2014, the
Beijing No. 4 Intermediate People’s Court and Shanghai No. 3 Intermediate
People’s Court were given the responsibility of adjudicating major civil,
commercial, administrative, environmental and resource protection, food and
drug safety, and certain criminal cases that cross the cities’ different districts.
The Beijing No. 4 Intermediate Court reported that it accepted 2,893
administrative disputes in 2016, twice the amount it accepted in 2015—an
increase attributable to the Court’s strict adherence to accepting appeals
immediately after registration rather than first subjecting them to an initial
court review.139
This experiment was extended to the provincial level in June 2015,
when the SPC promulgated opinions on trans-regional centralized jurisdiction
over administrative cases. These opinions instructed certain higher people’s
courts to, according to respective local conditions, designate some courts to
exercise jurisdiction over trans-regional administrative cases, to integrate
resources of administrative adjudication, and to improve the judicial
environment for administrative adjudication.140 Higher people’s courts such
as in Fujian, Shandong, Henan, and Guangdong, have assigned jurisdiction
135
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over certain administrative cases of first instance to certain designated
intermediate people’s courts that differ from the courts that typically have
jurisdiction over such cases (usually the administrative organ where the
defendant is located).141
As the timetable above demonstrates, with a top-down system like
China’s, implementation of proposed reforms takes place very quickly. It
only took three months to set up the proposed circuit courts, complete with
the appointment of judges, law clerks, selection of the court sites, and
coordination with both central and provincial governments. Planning for
these courts was likely to have been undertaken long before their
pronouncements, but the actual implementation did take place with
astonishing speed. Yet, while the physical establishment of these courts is
complete, the more difficult questions regarding their incarnation are the ones
that Malcolm Feeley asks. Namely, how are such reforms to be received and
will routinization take place?
Two obstacles facing circuit courts have already been identified:
physical hardships and an overwhelming caseload. In their first year, the first
two circuit courts accepted a combined 1774 cases, which amounts to 70 cases
per judge.142 But both circuit courts also received more than 43,000 visitors,
and the No. 1 Circuit Court received 2196 letters.143 The combination of the
added complexity of cross-province cases and the sheer number of petitioners
has meant that many judges work overtime and on weekends. Additionally,
while today’s transportation options render traveling less physically strenuous
and the Internet and cell phones have made communication more accessible,
many circuit court judges resent having to be away from their homes and
families in Beijing for two years. Finally, the rotation system means that these
circuit courts will always be manned by a group of judges who, while
experienced, are nevertheless new to the locality.144
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While it is too early to determine whether routinization will take place,
these circuit courts have already established their priorities. One of the first
guidances issued by the No. 2 Circuit Court regarded setting standards in
tough administrative litigation cases involving local governments. On August
4, 2017, the No. 2 Circuit Court issued a set of thirty case summaries on
administrative cases selected from the many administrative cases heard in the
first year and half of operation. 145 These cases primarily dealt with challenges
to local government’s demolition and land taking.146 Although this document
does not have any formal status, it was approved at a conference of
administrative judges in Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin, and the rules it sets
out are now considered highly persuasive to courts in those three provinces.
The No. 1 Circuit Court, meanwhile, also recently published an explanation
of twelve selected case decisions.147
Circuit courts serve an important function. In addition to centralization,
these courts are able to collect information at the ground level, ensure
uniformity, and curb local influences. They do so both by actually
adjudicating cases and issuing guidance drawn from the cases adjudicated.
Additionally, these courts are important because they provide a platform on
which the Supreme People’s Court can try judicial reforms in an environment
directly under its control. Chinese reforms are often carried out first
experimentally on a smaller scale before moving to a national scale. Circuit
courts and the pilot inter-district courts already serve this function. Judges
staffing these courts are highly experienced, and they can issue decisions
without the prior approval of court presidents. Circuit court judges are said to
carry out judicial experiments that include seeking to separate the judiciary’s
adjudicatory functions from its administrative functions, prioritizing the role
of court hearings, and applying the “case handling responsibility system,” in
which a single judge, rather than a collegiate panel, takes responsibility for
deciding cases. 148
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In 1983, Malcolm Feeley identified a number of obstacles that stand in
the way of United States court reform, and his conclusions are still relevant
today. The obstacles Feeley identified include the presence of diverse
constituencies with different and often conflicting expectations of the system,
unattainable objectives, and the reality that courts lack a central authority or
unified value system. In the context of China, the first two of these obstacles
have been clearly present, but China represented the flip side of United States
judicial reform problems in two other respects. Rather than lacking in central
authority or a unified value system, China’s judicial reforms have faced the
same problem as all centralized regimes: the problem of governing
responsively despite changing political winds.
Indeed, as in the United States, expectations for Chinese courts are
diverse and at times conflicting. For example, while Chinese courts
themselves may be more concerned with efficiency and workload, the Chinese
central government may be more concerned with promoting social stability.
Chinese reformers also face unrealistic expectations for Chinese courts.
Chinese courts are expected to simultaneously promote economic
development, rein in local officials and provide equal individualized justice,
while at the same time promoting social stability, securing centralization, and
easing pressures on Beijing. Such high expectations have led to a period of
“informed disenchantment” with the Chinese courts.
Unlike the United States, however, China is a planned, top-down polity
with a national identity, and Chinese courts are expected to promote national
goals. Within a top-down regime, planned change, once mandated, can occur.
In China, judicial reform plans originate under the Central Committee
Leading Group on Judicial Reform. Once accepted by the Politburo of the
CPC, these preliminary opinions serve as a foundation for multi-year plans
prepared by the various leading groups on judicial reforms established with
the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the
Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice.149 Accordingly, the
problem facing China is less that of a diffuse polity, but rather one that is
highly centralized, with each legal institution undertaking institutional
reforms under the guidance and coordination of the Central Committee
Leading Group on Judicial Reforms.150
149
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As a result, Chinese reforms can both take too long and occur too
quickly. If not accepted by the Politburo of the CPC, needed change may
happen very slowly or not at all. If change does take place, it will always be
subject to a regime change, political whim, and the next set of national goals.
Feeley’s proposed solution for United States court reform was to adopt a
problem-oriented “rights strategy”: letting the courts themselves solve
specific problems placed before them through litigation because courts are
well-placed to identify specific problems and devise pragmatic solutions. But
litigation-based strategies have limited effect in China. Chinese reforms have
curbed impact-type litigation by disaggregating cases and promoting
mediation. And although the SPC can issue judicial interpretations said to fill
legislative gaps, Chinese court judges do not make law through case decisions.
In China, many of the problems facing the judiciary are deeply rooted in the
political-economic system and may not be easily changed by the judiciary
itself.
Yet Feeley’s litigation- and court-centered proposal does make sense
for China in a different way, which may be why the circuit courts were
created. Chinese judicial reforms have faced the main problem of any
centralized regime: that of responsive governance. Here, the center in Beijing
may be too far removed to correctly diagnose judicial deficiencies. In addition
to centralization, the presence of these “branches” of the Supreme People’s
Court may provide an information funnel for the court to have direct access
to local legal issues and to interact with local legal communities. It does, in a
sense, let the judiciary take information from litigation, even if the litigation
itself does not create the change. This was demonstrated by the recent
promulgation of guidance documents and publication of sample cases by the
No. 1 and 2 Circuit Courts.
Specifically, Article 8 of the SPC Provisions on Circuit Court Divisions
empowers the circuit courts to report and transfer back to Beijing any cases
that have major guidance value. Article 9 also requires circuit court divisions
to ride circuit within their region to try cases and receive petitioners. Getting
information back to the center is important for a country as vast as China that
lacks democratic structures of accountability and information funneling.
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These circuit courts may then serve both to bring the center to the localities
and, in turn, relay information from the localities back to Beijing.151
In reducing the caseload from the headquarters of the Supreme People’s
Court in Beijing, these circuit courts free the Supreme People’s Court,
allowing it to optimize its role and function, and better guide the lower courts.
According to the Supreme People’s Court annual report, almost every year the
caseload is more than 10,000.152 Cases heard in 2015 at the Supreme Court
were up 42.6% compared with 2014, with most cases still heard at
headquarters in Beijing, rather than in the two circuit courts existing at the
time.153 However, with the addition of four more circuit courts, the caseload
of the Supreme People’s Court will definitely be reduced. This may lead to
the Supreme People’s Court spending more time on important cases and
providing better guidance the lower courts, as the United States Supreme
Court does.
The latest set of Chinese judicial reforms is an effort to unify the
application of laws in a highly concentrated central government, which faces
a country with huge local differences and diversity of local interests, cultures,
and norms. These changes reflect efforts to centralize and be more responsive.
The central government needs to have an early handle on cases with national
import. But if Malcolm Feeley is correct, the higher the volume of cases and
the greater the emphasis on efficiency, the likelier it is that these new courts
will simply process cases to meet stated goals rather than promote real change.
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